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that the courts, in determining that due process has been accorded,
9
stress the fact that the defendant had the assistance of counsel.2
Most of the states have regarded the right to counsel to one
charged with serious crime as essential to justice, and have indicated
provision, statute, or established practheir position by constitutional
20
tice judicially approved.

EVIDENCE
ADMISSIBILITY OF EVIDENCE INDUCED BY MEANS OF
INTERCEPTED TELEPHONE COMMUNICATIONS
Upon trial under federal indictments for mail fraud and conspiracy, petitioners were convicted largely by the testimony of two
witnesses who had been induced to turn state's evidence by being confronted with phonographic recordings of telephone messages intercepted
by federal investigators, to which messages the petitioners had not
been parties. Petitioners made objection to the testimony of the witnesses where such testimony was induced or refreshed by the use
of such intercepted messages on grounds that such messages were
illegally obtained in violation of the Federal Communication Act. 48
Held, testimony induced
STAT. 1103 (1934), 47 U.S.C. § 605 (1941).
by illegally intercepted telephone communications admissible against
one not a party to the communication. Goldstein v. United States, 316
U.S. 114 (1942).
The common law rule, that- the admissibility of evidence is not
affected by the illegality of the means through which the party
has been enabled to obtain the evidence, prevailed in the federal
courts until repudiated on the grounds that the illegal seizure,
being a violation of the rights secured by the Fourth Amendment
was inadmissible in evidence. Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616,
634 (1885). This prohibition against admissibility was in effect removed later. Cf. Adams v. New York, 192 U.S. 585, 586 (1904).
Whatever question this latter decision may have left concerning the
admissibility of illegally obtained evidence, it was later held that
documents obtained through search made by a federal officer without
warrant were inadmissible as evidence if prior to trial a motion
was made for the return of such documents. Weeks v. United States,
232 U.S. 383, 396, 398 (1914). The tendency of the federal courts to
See Kelley v. Oregon, 273 U.S. 589, 591 (1927); Frank v. Mangum, 237 U.S. 309, 344 (1915); Felts v. Murphy, 201 U.S. 123,
129 (1906).
20. See inst. case (appendix to dissenting opinion, p. 477). In only
two states has the requirement of counsel for indigent defendants
in non-capital cases been affirmatively rejected (Maryland and
Md.-; 25 A. (2d) 676
Texas). But see Coates v. State, (1942) where the Court of Appeals granted an appeal on an informal letter from the defendant, delivered after the expiration
of the period during which appeals must be filed, and reversed
the judgment. A colored boy of nineteen had been convicted without the aid of counsel on nine charges including robbery, assault,
and burglary. In reversing the judgment the court held that
counsel should have been appointed as, an essential of due-process
of law.
19.
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restrict the operation of the rule that evidence illegally obtained is
inadmissible, is apparent. Evidence secured through illegal search
and seizure has been held admissible where no application for return was made prior to trial. Youngblood v. United States, 266 Fed.
795, 797 (C.C.A. 8th, 1920), McMann v. Engel, 16 F. Supp. 446, 448
(S.D.N.Y. 1936), 87 F. (2d) 377 (C.C.A. 2d, 1937), cert. denied, 301
U.S. 684 (1937); where the search and seizure is made by a third
party not acting in collusion with federal officers, Burdeau v. McDowell, 256 U.S. 465, 467 (1921); where illegal search and seizure is
made by a state officer, United States v. Falloco, 277 Fed. 75, 81
(W.D.Mo. 1922); where illegal search and seizure was made on premises not owned or occupied by defendant, MacDaniel v. United States,
294 Fed. 769, 771 (C.C.A. 6th, 1924). Search and seizure with consent of party-defendant is not within the rule, Dillon v. United States,
279 Fed. 639 (C.C.A. 2d, 1921); where defendant is not the party
against whom the illegal search and seizure was made, Connolly V.
Medalie, 28 F. (2d) 629, 630 (C.C.A. 2d, 1932).
Evidence obtained by the modern method of wire tapping was
first held to be admissible as not being a search and seizure in violation of the FOURTH AMEINDMENT. Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S.
The act of wire tapping was made illegal by 48
438, 464, (1928).
STAT. 1103 (1934) 47 U.S.C. § 605 (1941), and evidence thus obtained
was declared to be inadmissible. Nardone v. United States, 302 U.S.
379, 381 (1937). Any evidence derived from or made accessible by
the act of wire tapping was held to be inadmissible. Nardone v.
Evidence from wire tapUnited States, 308 U.S. 338, 341 (1939).
ping was held inadmissible although consent to the interception was
given by one party to the communication, United States v. Polakoff,
112 F. (2d) 888 (C.C.A. 2d, 1940) cert. denied, 311 U.S. 653 (1940),
Note (1941) 16 Ind. L.J. 412.
In the instant case, there are indications that the courts are to
construe illegal wire tapping just as any other illegal search and
seizure in violation of a party's constitutional rights, subject to all
the exceptions and limitations which have attached to the law as set
forth in Weeks v. United States, supra, until such time as it is recognized that public policy is not served by permitting the fact of an
illegal search and seizure to prevent the introduction at the trial of
indispensable evidence in the state's case. The path of effective law
enforcement is one to be facilitated rather than obstructed.

LEGISLATION
SPECIAL MUNICIPAL ELECTION

LAWS

The legislature enacted a statute which postponed elections of
officials for all cities and school cities in the state except those
of the first class. The statute was attacked as a violation of constitutional provisions forbidding special legislation. Held, the act was
special in violation of the constitution. Ettinger et al. v. Studevent,
Hole et al. v. Dice, -Ind.-, 38 N.E. (2d) 1000 (1942).
The Indiana Legislature is forbidden to enact special laws on
17 enumerated subjects, and special legislation cannot be enacted in

